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FEDERAL EXl'ENDITURES AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: AN EXPLORATORY 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
James A. Hanson* 
Introduction 
Although economists have been rapidly increasing the volume of literature 
dealing with the application of economic tools to pol:l.tical problems, most of 
their work deals with theoretical models of democratic government and little 
empirical work has been done in the area. Moreover, their models of a government 
which acts as a vote-maximizing entrepreneur facing a participating citizenry 
seem somewhat inappropriate for the less developed countries. 
In general, the assumed motivation for such acute political entrepreneurship 
is self-interest--the combination of rewards for staying in office, whether pay, 
1graft, or prestige, must exceed those in alternative occupations. However, in 
reality the temptation must always exist to prolong the stay in office and the 
resulting benefits through an expansion of the day-to-day administrative power 
which the electorate must cede to the governors.rather than through the electoral 
process. In this case the benefits of office are sought by power rather tha~ 
competition, in an analogous fashion to the seller in a competitive market who 
~Assistant Professor, Brown University. The author is indebted to Peter Allgeier 
for performing preliminary calculations, for improvements in phrasing, and for 
translating the recent Mexican documents which were used; to Jack Hadley and Mike 
Toothman for calculations, and to all of them, as well as to his colleague, Robert 
Barro, for helpful di.ncussions and criticisms. Of course, the responsibility 
for any errors, opinions, and interpretations remains his own. 
See, for example, A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper 
Row, 1957) Chapters 1 and 2. 
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who seeks profits by forming a monopoly with its corresponding market power, 
rather than by competing. This type of government should not be treated as a 
vote-maximizing entrepreneur. but as a group seeking benefits from running the 
government rather than dealing with it, as the other interest groups do. 
The disparity of power between governed and governing which permits this 
situation to arise is particularly common in less developed countries. Moreover, 
if, as is quite likely in LDC' s, the p:er.cc:i.tage of t'.:re p@pulace wl'lo can ~ff et­
tivel;)Z demand participaidion~.iv. gove::::niacut.-dec.:'.sfo;:r, matci11g is low, the government 
can probably withhold actual participation and offer compensation through favor­
able government policies at the expense of the non-participants. 1 
Such situations often end with sudden changes in the government, and, 
sometimes, institutions. Usually these are only changes of the guard; occasionally 
the small group which was favored by government actions is also changed. Examples 
of this type of governmental change can be found in the 19th century history of 
many of the Latin American republics. Much rarer are the changes in governing 
structure which involve mass participation and rarer still are those which have 
succeeded in maintaining and implementing the goals which generated mass partici­
pation. Thus, although insurrections have often succeeded, only a few revolutions 
have attained even a qualified success; the distinction made here is between the 
simple change-over which occurs ia an insurrection and the constructive phase 
which is necessary for a revolution to achieve its goals .. 2 
Often the difficulty in carry:tng out the co.:1st:ructive phase of a popular 
revolution results from a redefinition of the revolutionary goals in a way that 
is inconsistent with its original aims. In this case the new government ceases 
1some hints of these problems are contained in Buchanan and Tulloch, The Calculus 
of Consent (Ann Arobr, Michigan, 1965), pp, :.::4-295, 339; and Downs, Chapter 2. 
2See also K. Boulding, Revolution and Development 
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to serve those for whom and by whom the revolution was waged. Instead, the regime's 
.. . 
decision making processes are manipulated or circumvented, once again becoming 
coincident with the interests of the ruling individual or ruling groups. Since an 
individual figure often dominates the government, in this case we shall term the 
result "personalism," although "personalism" is, of course, also a group phenomena. 
The "political" economists' models suggest that one way to reduce the diver-
sion from the original revolutionary goals is greater participation in or "demo­
cratization" of the decision making processes. Then those who rule will be more 
closely identified with the interests of those who waged the revolution, and their 
power will be reduced. However, if many different interest groups of relatively simi­
lar strength actually participate, their efforts can be largely offsetting, or they 
can be played off against one another 1 narrowing only slightly the ruling group's free­
dom to maneuver and benefit itself. In a sense the ruling group charges large fees 
for mediating conflict between the interest groups. To prevent this, the groups seek­
ing participatory power often band together to establish an institutional framework 
within which they will negotiate their differences; they agree on "how to disagree." 
Institutionalization can therefore be thought of as the development of governing pro­
cesses and operations which adhere to generally accepted, publicly known procedures of 
decision making, and which are not readily subject to manipulation by those in author­
ity. When this occurs, the various interest groups have agreed on the form and process 
of disagreement. In addition, they also usually agree to reduce the governors' or 
administrators' benefits. The governors are then forced to operate within a system of 
constraints which they, the populace, and the interest groups recognize. Usually a 
series of criteria for judging the decision making process and the day-to-day adminis­
trative decisions are also developed, as is a mechanism for obtaining new administrators. 
---
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This paper investigates the success of the Mexican attempt to reduce 11 person­
alism11 through the "democratization" of their revolution. Thus it is an attempt to 
make an empirical assessment of the progress of Mexican government from the "personal" 
model of government to the institutional democracy of the political economists. The 
Mexican case is especially interesting for it has been lauded by many, both within 
and outside the Republic, as providing an example par excellence of an institution­
alized social revolution of national proportions,which has been sustained over a 
period of several decades without losing the momentum of its infancy and adolescence.
1 
In the first two sections of this paper the lines are drawn over the degree to 
which various observers believe popular participation has been achieved, personalism 
reduced, and the benefits of government activity diffused. Those more interested 
in empirical results or those familiar with the controversy over the degree of power 
retained by the president and the administrators and the evidence on the distribution 
of benefits, might skip to section four, which presents some obvious tests of the 
relative strength of presidential power and party-popular control and rejects them. 
The fifth section presents a more sophisticated test of "personalism" versus insti-
tutional restraints based on the variation in expenditures over a 1)residential .. ,.,.......'-'1.-&.Ul• 
The sixth section discusses another test of "personalism" based on the pattern of 
public spending and the seventh still another, based on the relationship between the 
proposed budget and the additional spending which is controlled by the president. 
In the last section the results are summarized and some projections about Mexican 
political problems and budgetary policies arc ventured. 
1see La Republica, the magazine published by the PRI; also see Ross, Stanley (ed.},
Is the Mexican Revolution Dead? (New York! Knopf, 1966), pp.129-134, 156-160,
169-174, and 195-209. 
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II The Party and the Institutionalized Revolution: 
A Sympathetic View 
In the view of many, the development of an official party was a crucial element 
1in the democratization and institutionalization of the ongoing Mexican revolution. 
The party first appeared in an organized fashion in 1929 as the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR). At that time the outgoing president, Calles, sought to overt 
civil strife with the Agrarista party and other supporters of the recently assas­
sinated, president-elect General Alvaro Obregon through the formation of a national 
political party. 2 All groups supporting the revolution ~articipated in the party 
which provided established procedures for nominating officials and making decisions. 
According to some observers, it was only the development of allegiance to the 
party, wrapped as it was in revolutionary nationalism, and the aggregation of 
interests within it, that prevented a military take-over and permitted the orderly 
changes of civilian administration during the early depression years. In addition, 
Calles' adherence to the party's choice of candidates permitted the philosophical 
changes toward peaceful social revolution implied by Cardenas' nomination and 
1 see, for example: R.E. Scott, Mexican Governnent j_n Tra:asition (Urbana, Illinois: 
University of Illinois, 1964); henceforth Scott, W.Padgett, The Mexican Political 
System (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966), henceforth Padgett;P. Sigmund, ed., 
Models of Political Change in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1970), Part One-­
Mexico: The Institutionalization of the Revolution, henceforth Sigmund; P. Calvert, 
"The Mexican Political System," Journal of De.relopment Studies, IV, July, 1968, 
pp. 464-480, henceforth Calvert; J. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal 
Expenditure and Social Chang_£ Since 1910 (Berkeley: University of California, 
1967), henceforth Wilkie. 
2calles' troubles and the degree to which revolutionary goals had been subverted 
are outlined in Padgett, pp. 30-32; Scott, pp. 117-120; and Wilkie, pp. 63-64. 
Recent interpretations also suggest that Portes Gil, Obreg6n's replacement, 
was an important force in the early partyo See Calvert, pp. 476-477, and Wilkie, 
p. 64. 
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1and later prevented open warfare between the conservative and radical groups. 
, 
Under Cardenas, the loose regional-functional structure which the party--now 
, 
called the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana--had used for nominations to the 
National Assembly was formalized into three or four more organized, functional 
sectors: military, agricultural, labor, and popular. Each sector received a 
certain number of delegates to the National Assembly which were then chosen by the 
sectoral leaders, with a majority of the sectors necessary for presidential nomi­
nation. All sectors would then unite in campaigning for the election of the 
Assembly's nominees. The party offered participatior. to the army as an alternative 
to military coup, however, the fornal organization of the other sectors provided 
a growing counterweight to military pressu.re, as well as support for Cardenas in 
his quarrel with Calles. i'iurther, the party's corporate structure reduced the 
?
importance of regional cacic_iues. - Since the sectors represented the majority of 
the Mexican electorate, Cardenas felt there -was little chance for the government 
3to swing off on a personalistic course. 
Since the thirties, the party I s 11 continuismo11 of the r,::;volutionary tradition 
has provided the support which ;.r1ade charismatic presidents in the tradition of 
4Calles and Cardenas unnecessary and permitted the choice of administrative types. 
Following Avila Camacho's defeat of the conservative general Almazan without 
military intervention, the formal military sector was dissolved; henceforth military 
participation was on an individual basis, showing the success of the search for 
1Padgett, pp.49, 50; Calvert, pp. 476, 477. 
2scott, pp.127-135. 
3 ·1 11F. Brandenberg, 'The Liberal Machiavellian in R. Tomasek, Latin American 
Politics, 2nd ed., (New York~ Anchor, 1970), p.315, henceforth Brandenberg. 
4
Padgett, pp.40-43, 50, 143-145; Clavert, pp.474, 477; Scott, ppo246-248, 310. 
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1political counterweights to the army. Also under Avila Camacho, C~rdenas' fourth 
sector--the popular sector··-was finally organized. The process of reducing mili­
tary power and increasing participation continued in 1946 with the nomination of 
the first president of completely civilian origins, Miguel Aleman Valdes, and the 
institution of nominations for all offices but the presidency by party-wide pri­
maries of the now renamed PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party). Although 
sectoral nominations were restored in 1950, the PRI still tried to include as 
many interests as possible. It declared itself the ilorganizer and control over 
the middle-class, as well as the defender of the municipio, of agrarian reform, of 
the rights of women, of youth and Indians, of morality in citizens and government 
official, of civic education, of economic intervention of the state and of pro­
tection of public interests, without by this limiting the opportunities of private 
enterprise for its development. 112 
In 1959 still further steps were taken to increase participation and communi­
cation between the grass roots and the hierarchy. Some provision has been made 
3for the nomination of conflicting slates within the PRI. Moreover, the role of 
the PRI as political entity, independent of both the government and the sectors, 
has increased. Preassembly decision making has bee·.., reduced, party nominations 
have been democratized, and an independent party organization involving more active 
recruitment and grass roots financial support has developed. 4 
1Scott, p .134; Calvert, p .l+77; Lieuwen, .~rms and Rolitics in Latin America (New
York: Praeger, 1960), Chapter lf. 
2Tiempo, February 17, 1950 as cited in: Scott, p.143. 
3Scott, pp. 143, 144. 
4Padgett, pp. 54-62: 
• •• 
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Surveying these changes it would seem that every twist and turn of party 
structure has been designed to increase public participation, thereby bringing the 
Revolution closer to the individual. The success of this policy has been lauded 
by many scholars. According to Padgett, the changes in party structure have 
resulted in an institution which is 11 a legitimizing symbol for the selection of 
candidates and a repository of procedural desires for minimizing arbitrary choice 
in the nominations of candidates at various levels. It should also be viewed as 
a vital communications center .•• and a mediating and liaison device. 111 "As an 
institution the party has durability beyond the personal popularity of individuals 
and it is this fact which has contributed to a change from personal continuism to 
a pattern of party continuism. 112 "Leaders now acted less on individual whim than 
on limitations imposed by public opinion. 113 An even more enthusiastic interpreter 
of the party's role, Scott, sees it as "an interest aggregator for Mexico's pro­
liferating functional interests (who) feel growing dependency upon the party 
mechanism for adjusting their conflicts.n4 Scott's summary view is that "the PRI 
is the most influential mechanism in Mexico's political system but it is only one 
of a large number of subsystems."5 The final measure of this growing political 




3Wilkie, p. 75. 
4Scott, p.175; see also Scott, pp. 146, 257-8, 301-
5Scott, p. ·3-15. 
.. ... •• - .. ,. ~ ·• •• co • 
~h _:,_••...:.:~ _•.:....: ' - - -"'·••• • :• •'•· • '• ••, ,,,;,,. -~ •'\•J• 
Scott, "The Established Revolution" in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture 
and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 345. 
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Lest there be any doubt in Mexico ab.out the party's intentions along these 
lines and its overall role, the policy statements which are cemi:::1:ed.:. from the huge 
office on Avenida Insurgentes are designed to convince even the most skeptical 
Mexican of the PRI's unswerving loyalty to the three tenents of the Revolution: 
(1) la democracia, the right of the people to participate in the conduct and manage-
ment of public affairs and in the orientation and planning of vital problems con­
cerning the collectivity; (2) el nacionalismo, the sovereign decision of the 
people to determine their present and their future in accord with their respective 
genius and the imperatives of their own history and to achieve their greatness in 
conformity with what co~responds to their highest interests; (3) Ja justicia social, 
the firm and constant will to transform decrepit social institutions, with the aim 
of satisfying the increasingly urgent needs of the disadvantaged and to fashion 
a strong and free Mexico in which everyone has the right to reap the benefit of 
1his work in a climate of peace and concord. It is also claimed that the PRI, as 
its name implies, has the leading role in effecting the peaceful reforms and trans-
formation within the nation, which are necessary to achieve these goals. 2 
cuatro Anos de ALH; Asi se gobierna, senor Presidente!" La Republica, /1251, 
pp.2-4. The author is indebted to Peter Allgeier for this and most of the other 
recent documents cited, as well as their translation. 
~art!nez Dominguez, Alfonos, Posici6n del FRI ante los Problemas Nacionales de 
Actualidad, Mexico D.F., 1968, p.24, · ---------
111
10 
III The Presidency and the Institutionalized Revolution: 
A Critical View 
Of course not all students of the Mexican party agree on the party's role in 
maintaining revolutionary goals and curbing personal and governmental excesses, 
nor are the favorable views unhedged. Despite the previously documented attempts 
to develop a viable national revolutionary party in which all sectors of society 
participate and which constrains the national leaders to pursue revolutionary goals, 
some observers agree with Brandenburg that "Mexico is ruled by an elite to which 
we assign the label of Revolutionary family;' and that the head of this family is 
usually the president. 1 
Interpreters of this persuasion view the period before the formation of the PNR 
as one in which the Revolutionary aims were blunted, class conflict muted, and the 
revolutionary leaders grew rich and fat. 2 Under the same interpretation, the forma­
tion of the party was simply Callesv transformation from caudillo to a more modern 
machine boss; 3 certainly most observers agree that he controlled the actions of 
Ortiz Rubio and Abelardo Rodriguez and downgraded Revolutionary goals. 4 
Later, "as the official party constantly grew stronger, the President of 
1see Brandenburg, "The Revolutionary Fa~i,ly/1 in Sigmund, p.27. 
2Padget:t:, p.20-;;WilR:j.e.j. pp.61, 65. 
3Daniel James, Mexico and the Americans (New York, 1963), p.246, cited in Padgett,
p.48. See also Scott, pp.123, 124. 
4For example:,. the Labor Code of 1931 restricted labor's rights and, compared to the 
administration of Portes Gil, the rate of land distribution was substantially slowed,
largely at the whim of Calles, who disciplined those who disagreed. Although some 
provision was made for agricultural credits, no money was actually allotted in 
1933 and 1934. See Wilkie, pp. 68, 137-139; Scott, p.123; Padgett, ppo 30, 33, 91. 
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Mexico grew stronger still •••• He tied the whole political system together, making 
possible the party's very existence. To this end the president used his power to 
enforce discipline among the functional sectors ••• [and] the state politicians •••• 
It was the president who balanced the competing demands of the many interests.
111 
As the locus of power gradually shifted from the party to the presidential govern-
ment, the president became the focal point of political action, 
2 until one observer 
has claimed that it is "the orientation of the president and those close to him 
which are decisive in determining which groups and interests receive priority in 
3the decision making choices"; and another that "the power of the president has· no 
limit but that of time, his six years in office. 114 Moreover, those interests and 
groups that cannot be overlooked and are less subject to manipulation and control can 
often be played off against one another by the "Liberal Machiavellian."
5 Given this 
interpretation, it is not surprising that most of the 65 per cent who play political 
roles are·subjects; it is estimated that only 10 per cent, mostly drawn from the 
urban middle and upper classes, are truly participants and provide inputs to the 
116political process. 
1Scott; pp. 136; 137. See also Padgett, pp.155-6. 
2Scott, pp. 244, 257, 280. 
3G. Almond and G. B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1966), p.270. See also Scott, pp.261-282. 
4statement of Enrique Parra Hernandez, an inner circle politician in the Aleman 
epoch, quoted in Brandenburg, p.312. 
5This presidential title is used by Brandenburg. For some examples see Scott, pp. 
210, 259, 309, where the development of a rival labor organization is discussed. 
Also see G. Huizer, "Peasant Organization in Agrarian Reform in Mexico" in I. 
Horowitz, ed., Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford, 1970) for a discussion of 
early manipulations forthe benefit of officialdom within the agrarian reform 
program. 
6R. Scott, "The Established Revolution, 11 p. 345. 
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It is also not surprising that "the personality of each president is apt to 
111influence the political process, each administration comes to be identified with 
2the president and all policies, public works, etc., bear his stamp. It is still 
3the president who gives public works to the nation. This tendency toward personal-
ism is reinforced by the president's first act, the replacement of all government 
officials with those loyal to him, which means a turnover in roughly 18,000 elected 
4
and 25,000 appointive posts. 
As suggested earlier, personalistic rule can easily result in a redefinition 
of the revolution and divert programs from the fulfillment of revolutionary goals-­
critics of the Mexican regime suggest this has been the case. According to them 
and contrary to Cardenas' hopes, 11 decision making in Mexico has been dominated by 
5the urban middle sectors since the early 1940's" --the so-called popular sector plus 
the business interests. In many cases the latter have bypassed the PRI and dealt 





-'"El senor presidente da a los mexicanos" quoted in Brandenburg, p.346. 
4Brandenburg in Sigmund, p.29. Of course, many simply switch positions. See also 
Scott, pp.248-258. 
5Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: Emergence of the Uiddle Sectors 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959). 
6See Padgett, pp.123-29, and R. Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.130 (henceforth Vernon) 
for some evidence on the extent to which these groups dominate the party. The role 
of the business "camaras" and their extra-party links to the president are discussed 
in Scott, pp.285-88. For some earlier evidence see S. Mask, Industrial Revolution 
in Mexico (Berkeley: University of California, 1950) Chapters 2-5, 10. 
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As a result the building of infrastructure and industrialization received first 
priority after 19401 and most of the benefits of these programs were obtained by 
these dominant groups, while the lower classes, workers, and farmers benefitted 
much less. 
The evidence on this last point is not completely clear and comes from a variety 
of sources. For example, one critic, Brandenburg, suggests that there is a conscious 
government tendency to provide jobs for college graduates as well as Revolutionary 
2
offspring. 
Another, more quantitative measure of the government's impact is the avail-
able information on income distribution. These figures show that income distribu­
tion was materially altered between 1950 and 1957 and there may have been some 
absolute decline in real incomes of the lowest classes and some expansion of the 
share of middle and upper middle income groups. 3
 In terms of functional categories, 
wage earners seem to have suffered some relative decline between 1940 and 1950 and 
scarcely improved themselves between 1950 and 1957" Most of the absolute rise in 
1 see Wilkie, pp.82-88, 149-150; Vernon, pp.88-127. 
? 
-Brandenburg, pp.333-334. 
31.~1. Navarrete, La Distribuci6n del Ingreso y el Desarrollo Economico de Mexico 
(Mexico, D.F.: Universidad Nacional, 1960). A partial translation is I.M. 
Navarrete, 11 Income Distribution in Mexico, 11 M. Uriquidi, trans., Mexico's Recent 
Economic Growth (Austin, Texas~ University of Texas, 1967) (henceforth Navarrete), 
and much of the available work on Mexican income distribution is summarized in M. 
Singer, Growth, Equality, and the Mexican Experience (Austin, Texas: University of 
Texas, 1969), pp.119-139 (henceforth Singer). Of course, these estimates are 
subject to the usual problems inherent in such comparisons, namely the treatment of 
imputed incomes and subsistence consumption which are particularly important to 
the lower classes and the substantial differences in consumption habits which 
makes two different price deflators almost necessary, although only one exists. 
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their incomes seemed to have occurred as a result of the shift from agricultural 
to nonagricultural employment. 
1 During much of this peri~d the rate of inflation 
exceeded wage increases
2 and, despite the PRI's self-proclaimed role as a labor 
party, strikes were held down. 
3 
Moreover, comparisons between industry and agriculture show that average income 
per agricultural worker is ouch lowe:.:- than average income in the rest of the 
economy and the improvement in agriculture's relative status between 1940 and 1950 
was largely the result of increases i.n entrepreneurial income. 
4 As would be 
expected, given the unequal earnings in industry and agriculture and the regional 
concentration of industrial ernployment, there are large differences in per capita 
regional incomes. 
5 Furth0r support fo:r this view can be found in a state poverty 
index of deprivation computed by Wilkie. This index shows that while there has 
been a substantial overall reduction in the poverty index, there has been little 
or no change in th2 relative pouition of the states and regions and a widening of 
the dispersion about the national average between 2.940 and 1960. 
6 
~avarette, Singer, pp.134-139. 
2Wilkie, p.88; Vernon, p,93, 
3singer, pp.66-80, 153-57; Wilkie, p.89. According to Singer organized labor 
did somewhat better, but their gains merely kept pace with inflation. 
4Navarrete, p.140. Since farmers tend to have larger families, the per capita 
distribution is even worse" 
5Navarrete, pp.144-158. 
6wilkie 1 s index of deprivation is an ul1weighted average of the per cent of the 
population who are illiterates, speak only Indian languages, live in villages 
under 2,500 inhabitants, gc barefoot, wear sar..dals, eat tortillas, and have no 
sewage disposal in their residence" The index is calculated for each state and 
for the nation as a whole. Using the figures by state, the decile figures, as 
15 
Singer suggests that the slow growth of social welfare programs necessary to 
cure this deprivation.;, as well as the slo--:, growth of the whole Mexican economy in 
the early 1960 1 s, was caused by a lack of tax revenues. According to him, it was 
difficult to raise taxes for these programs because political participation was not 
diffused enough to permit the lower classes to offset the negative voices of the 
1
urban middle classes on whom the taxes would fall. 
More recently the very need to return to a "balanced revolution" under Lopez 
6 cont'd 
a percentage of the national mean, are 
1st or lowest 
dec:f.le o:: 
population 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
1940 133 122 120 110 109 103 95 74 66 24 
1950 140 127 123 llli 109 103 . 88 69 22 22 
1960 150 133 119 118 108 95 82 66 26 26 
Obviously the component parts of the index are interrelated and may reflect 
government policy. For example, the areas with many Indians score high in the 
poverty index but this r.1ay reflect the wavering of the Mexican government between 
permitting the Indians to retain their own culture and language and integrating 
them into national life. Similarly it is easier to go without shoes on the un­
paved streets of small villages tha~ in Mexico City and sewage needs may also be 
less. Finally the goverr:me!1t :may simply have found it cheaper to reduce poverty 
in Mexico City and let those who seek escape from the deprivation of,the country­
side move there, elthough external diseconomies must now be rising rapidly. Never­
theless, these figures show 2. significant E-:nd growing spread between the Mexican 
Center City or cities and the periphery. See also P. Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal 
Colonization and Natio·aal Development," in Sigmund, pp.30·-3. 
1Singer, pp. 273-275. Brm1.d1:;nburg in Sigrnmd, p. 29; Brandenburg, p. 316. This 
problem is not confined to MezL.:o; see for example, J. Cooke, "Peronisr:r and the 
Coup d'Etat of 1966," in Sis,,mnd 9 pp.171-·17I+. Of course, this interpretRtion, 
that participatton had not incre2sed enough tc fo:;::c2 higher taxes on the upper 
classes, is just the opposite oi Venwn' s argument that so many gi:oups had become 
participants ·with veto power that nothing coult.i be done. See Vernon, The Dilemma 
of Mexico 7 s Devc1.opr1ent, (Ce.mbridge: :-Iarvard University Press, 1965) pp.188-193. 
16 
1
Mateos is prima facie evidence of the deviation from these revolutionary goals. 
Moreover, the disorders that preceeded the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City and the 
complaints of the participants seem to indicate some dissatisfaction with the 
achievements of the revolution among the poor, the favoritism shown the urban upper 
middle class, and the lack of participation and control. 
2 
These alleged failures of the Mexican revolution to achieve its goals imme­
diately raise the larger q1.1estion: Has the revolution been effectively institu­
tionalized? To what extent are political decisfons made on the basis of the on­
going PRI-revolutionary ideology, by politicians and bureaucrats pursuing revolu­
tionary goals, rather than at the personal whim of the president and the ruling 
classes? As described earlier, the party leaders claim they have effectively 
institutionalized participation and the Revolution, but hopefully we can find more 
substantial proof than political statements. OthE:rwise, we must conclude that 
despite all efforts to the contrary, the Mexican caudillo and cacique, in the tradi­
tion of Porfirio Diaz and Santa An&, still exists; he has merely swapped his serape 
for a three-piece suit and his caballo for a Mercedes Benz. 
1w11kie, pp.89-91. 
see "Documents of the Student Revolt," in Sigmund, pp.33, 36. 2 
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IV Using the Federal Budget to Measure Institutionalization: 
Trends in Expenditure 
One area which might permit some statistical assessment of the growth or decline 
in institutionalization and personalization is the Federal budget. Not only does 
the budget lend itself more readily to measurement and comparison over time than 
speeches, legislative programs, and political or sociological indices, which might 
change independently of government policy, the budget also represents one obvious 
area in which the government's commitment to the revolutionary program, as well as 
its own goals, would clearly manifest itself.-
1 
Finally Professor Wilkie's monumental 
work makes comparable figures on the budget available for the various presidential 
terms. 
In broadest terms some differences between each president's commitment to the 
revolutionary goals of the party can be observed through a comparison of the per­
centage of spending devoted to the three broad categories of expenditure defined 
1This is not to imply that other policies such as laws on discrimination, working 
conditions, minimum wages, the right to strike, tariffs, land distribution, etc., 
are not important, only that the Federal budget is the most easily measured tool 
of government policy. Even confining the investigation to budgetary figures does 
not solve all the empirical problems of political economy. First one may question 
the correctness of the figures, for there may be large unconcealed expenditures. 
However, Wilkie suggests that expenditures are not so much hidden as inflated. 
(Wilkie, pp.8-9). This suggests that comparisons between administrations might 
require a correction for changes in the rate of contract, as well as price, 
inflation. That items providing similar services cost significantly different 
amounts is well demonstrated by Wilkie's example of the different costs of an 
hectare of irrigated land under Lopez Mateos (27,693 pesos) and Ruiz Cortines 
(3,798 pesos). But even if estimates of graft were available, more difficult 
problems would be encountered in judging the extent to which the budgets were made 
taking graft into account. Though these are interesting questions, this paper must 
ignore them. 
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1by Wilkie: administrative, economic, and social. 
With regard to administrative expenditures, including the military and the 
public debt, the general tendency has been to reduce the proportion of federal 
funds spent on this area. Whereas Venustiano Carranza spent as much as 85.6 per 
cent of the annual budget on his administrative apparatus (1916), by 1963 L6pez 
2Mateos assigned only 36.1 per cent of federal funds to that sector. Presidents 
Ca:rdenas, Avila Camacho, Aleman and Lopez :Mateos all left office with a lower per~ 
centage of administrative expenses than had been obtained during the initial year 
of their respective administrations; of course, this did not preclude departures 
from the trend during their terms of office. 
Economic expenditure has received increasingly larger proportions of the national 
budget, most notably during the Aleman and Ruiz Cortines administrations,when for 
nine out of twelve years it accounted for more than half of the funds spent. As 
discussed earlier, the three presidents succeeding Cardenas appear to have made a 
definite decision to give national economic development priority over attention to 
the social needs of the people. Party leaders have attempted t0 justify this policy, 
interpreted by many as a departure from the tenets of the Re·•:olution, by claiming 
that development of the count:cy's economy would eventually result in greater social 
welfare through a 11 trickle down" process. The admirable growth of the Mexican 
economy since World War II probably reflects this emphasis and certainly denotes one 
of the most striking achievements of the Revolution. 3 During the Lopez Mateos adminis­
tration economic development did not receive quite the same priority that it had 





Social development has been the least favored of the expenditure categories; 
even under C.ardenas, the president most often associated with high social priori­
ties, the amount of the budget allotted to social development did not reach 20 per 
cent. During the administrations of Avila Camacho, Aleman, and Ruiz Cortines, 
the very strong emphasis upon economic jevelopment meant that the declines in the 
percentage of funds spent on administrative expenditures did not provide enough 
funding and (in budgetary terms) that the percentage spent in social development 
would also fall. This decline in the proportion of federal funds assigned to 
social development marked a reversal of the pattern established by Calles and, to 
a greater extent, by Cardenas. As previously mentioned, by the time of Lopez Mateos' 
inauguration it was clear that a renewed emphasis on social development was essen­
tial. Under that president the "balanced Revolutionn began and by 1962 social 
development expenditures reached one-fifth of federal expenditure for the first time. 
To be sure, many in Mexico complained most vociferously that the original aims of 
the Revolution demand a significantly larger effort in the social sphere. However, 
the election of the rather conservative Gustavo Diaz Ordaz in 1964 insured that 
Mexico was not on the verge of a renaissance of Cardenismo, even if there were to 
be progress toward the realization of 11 balanced Revolution." 
While the differences in budgetary emphasis between administrations are fairly 
large and could be interpreted as an indication of a relatively unconstrained 
presidency, it is easy to pose an alternative hypothesis of institutionalized 
revolution which is supported by this budgetary data. Under this view the various 
presidents have actually followed the dictates of the PRI, which in turn enunciated 
very early a long-run development strategy consistent with the revolution: the 
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big push. Under this strategy in the first years of the party social needs were 
sacrificed to build up infrastructure; later this sacrifice would make possible a large 
1increase in income which could be used to satisfy social needs. If the members of 
the PRI actually had a low social discount rate, the emphasis on economic growth 
with a later switch to the "balanced revolution" may have been an effective and 
2optimal growth strategy. 
see the statements of Aleman and Ramon Beteta in Wilkie, pp.82, 84, 90-1 for 
suggestions, somewhat ex post~ of this view. 
2Wilkie suggests the balanced revolution was not really so balanced. See Wilkie, 
pp. 91-93, 164. 
1 
21 
V Using the Federal Budget to Heasure Institutionalization: 
Deviations from Trends in Expenditure 
Rather than the percentage spent in each category, the deviation from the 
trend
1 
in budgetary expenditure seems a more appropriate measure of growing or 
declining institutionalization. The reason for using the deviations arises f
rom 
what one author has called "The Political Cycle of Public Expenditure. 
112 Since 
Presidents cannot constitutionally succeed themselves and wholesale changes i
n the 
civil service occur every six years, there is a tendency for each administra
tion to 
The president, in order to define his administration tocompartmentalize itself. 
the public and establish himself within t;he Revolutionary Family, launches hi
s term 
with a budgetary splash and great public fanfare, concentrating his efforts o
n the 
areas of concern which, as described earlier, he has staked out as his specia
l 
province. After the initial impact is made and the tone set, the growth of e
xpen­
diture slakens. Finally, the presidential term closes with a rush of expend
iture 
and public deductions, for there is a reluctance to allow the benefits, wheth
er 
measured in prestige or graft, to fall to the successor and the members of the
 
next administration. 
3 Moreover, no president likes to commit his successor to major 
expenditures for often they will not be carried out:: and presidents have tra
dition-
1
The term "trend" will be used int2rchangeably to refer to tt.e ard..thmetic· and' 
tite· semi­
logarithmic time trend. While expenditures might obviously be determined by 
more 
percentage of the population ofcomplicated variables such as urban population 9 
we have chosen relatively simple hypothesis as is appropriate toschool age 9 etc. 9 
an exploratory paper. 
Nexico," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.2J. Kohler 9 lllnformation and Policy Making~ 
Yale University, 1968. See also Wilkie 9 p.107. 
3Brandenburg 9 pp.332-340. 
4see for example, the discussion of the fate of the Plan de Once Afios for edu
cation 
in Wilkie 9 p.164. 
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ally been free of their predecessor I s ir.fluence since the time of Cardenas. 
1 In 
keeping with this tradition 1 the budget which is passed by the outgoing president 
and left for the new president to administer usually contains no new major commit­
ments. Thus the continued existence of this compartmentalized pattern with what­
ever benefits the administration reaps from it would result in a large, relatively 
constant variation from the trend in expenditures, with some increase if the poli­
tical cycle and personalifm irn::reased. On the other hand, if it were true, as has 
been suggested, that the party~ rather than the president w2re important, the need 
to initiate projects at the beginning of an administration and complete them within 
a six-year span should diminish. Instec:id the projects could start at any economically 
optimal time, with the variance in the trend caused by lumpiness of projects. Thus 
the variations from the trend of expenditures should diminish as the Revolution 
2became less personal and more cor1trolled by the party. 
In addition, one might eJ[pec.t that variations in receipts and expenditures 
should also diminish through time for reasons which are unconnected with changes in 
personalism. On the one hand me.ny former "::unctions of the state have been taken 
over gradually by quasi public governm0nt agencies, often · -"· created by the presi­
Sent to cope with a "new" problem, WhiJ.e transfers and subsidies to these agen­
cies from the federal government are i:1cludsd in the figures usecl i,_ere, the agencies 
also obtain funds in othez- ways E:uch as floating inte;-:national loans, operating 




Of course, this argument assumes that optimal po~icy is a steady increase or 
decrease in projects or spe!:i.ding. 
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by the data on government spending used here. 
1 Moreover, purely as a result of 
there would be less need to change programs un­improvements in forecasting, 
expectedly. Further, earlier adninistrations suffered through much larger 
external fluctuations, namely the Great Depression, World War II, and the Korean 
War, and the impact of external fluctuations should have declined as the Mexican 
economy became more diversified and industrialized. Finally, as Mexican poli­
weretical stability became an established fact and the cl~ims with the U.S. 
settled, the costs of borrowing to ri:laintain the desired pattern of expenditure 
became less. Also, changes in tax rates to cover any desired expenditure 
pattern would have becoue easier if participation had really increased. 
2 
On the basis of these obse;rvations the following test of personalization-
institutionalization was uade: 
H ~ The variation in thE trend .of e:{penditure fror,1 adninistration to ad­
o 
i.e., the ratio of variationuinistration is declj_ning through tine, 
from the trend is significantly less than one or at most one. 
H: The variation in the trend of expenditure from adninistration to ad­
a 
u1inistration has not fallen, i.e., the ratio of variation from the 
trend between administrations is greater than one. 
1see Wilkie, pp. XXV, 6, 273. Vernon suggests that the lack of control over these 
agencies such as Pemex, the railroads and the electricity comraission, led to a 
tremendous rise in public investment and capital goods imports when Lopez Mateos 
took over. (See Vernon, p.119). Unless the Budgetary Reforn of 1965 is success­
ful, this phenomenum may continue, leading to a new type of political cycle of 
expenditures in which not the president but the,:~bureaucrats in charge of the 
agencies determine spending patterns. In that case it is likely that a big up­
surge in spending will occur in the first year of an adninistration, before the 
president really gains control. Of course this is not presidential personalism b 
but it does represent relatively uncontrolled spending by the governing class and 
thus falls under our broad definition of personalisn. For a further treatment of 
this question see Sections VII and VIII. 
2See footnote 1, p.15 1 No. 1. 
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The test was performed on total expenditures and on individual classes of budget­
ary expenditures which were judged to be particularly important in the revolutionary 
framework, education, public health, public works, agriculture, and investment and 
other economic expenditures. Expenditures were deflated and calculated on both a 
per capita and actual basis. 
It was then assumed that total government expenditure and spending in each 
category was made with the aim of increasing expenditures at some constant, real, 
peso rate or at some constant real growth rate per year. Under this assumption, 
regressions were run in the form: 
yt = a+ bt + ut 
t = time measured from the midpoint of the administration (t = 5, 3, l,· - 1, 
3, 5) 
yt = log of expenditure or expenditu:ce, where expenditure is measured in 
in 1950 pesos.-
1 
2 = random normal variable, mean~ 0, variance = V out 
The results of these regressions are shown in the Appendix, Table I, together 
with their variance. The most obvious point is the small difference between the 
results obtained with per capita and actDal figures; the available population figures 
1 see Wilkie for Experiiture data, except for the last year which was calculated from 
the Anuario Estadistico. For the price index see l3anco de Hexico Info:rme Anual, 1967 
ahd Banco de· Mexico Informp··Anaal 1955~. The Banco de :i'1exico 1 s whole sale::,price index 
(210 articles) was used as it was felt to be more comprehensive than the food price 
index (16 articles) which Wilkie, who was concerned with a 1onger per:tod, had to use. 
The price index for the first thru' years of the Ctrdenas admi:n.istration was calculated 
by using the ratio of i.:he food price index to -::be wholesale price index in the next 
three years. In the public works 2:xpendi.::ure·category the deflator uas calculated 
by using slightly different weigl:its for subsets of ·::he wholesale price index~ consump­
tion articles - . 60, metals - • l.5 • cons truetiou materials -· .15 ~ and vehicles - •10. 
Population figures were the. same. as Wilkie; s. 
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used are too similar to a time trend to substantially change the results. Second, 
it is easy to see that differences between the coefficients of the time trend and 
the constants or mean expenditures in each· administration are often statistically 
significant. However, these differences are simply a m&nifestation of the different 
presidential emphasis discussed in Section IV. Although these differences in em­
phasis ate interesting, it is the variations from the trends which, as discussed 
above, are the key to determining whether p£rsonalism increased or decreased. 
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Table I 
Significant Differences i~ the Patios of Sum of Sauared Errors 
Between Administrations Throuph Time 
Key to Symbols Aclministrations Tvne of Expenditure 
V1 = L6nez 1fateos 1959-6Lf TB = Total BudP-et 
PC = ruiz Cortines 1953-58 AG = AP'riculture 
A = Aleman 19117-52 PT.J = Public Harks 
AC = f.vila Ca.r:>acho lq41-tf6 PIT = Public Healt'1 
C = Cardenas 1935-l:.I) E = E<'lucation 
I = Investment 
Sip;. Level Sipnificant Increase in S~E Sipnificant Decrease in SSE 
Time Trend of Per Canita Peal Expenditures 
.05 TB : L: f/ RC , A/AC PH : P./C 
(TB : A/C, LH/,~C, LM/.C) l 
PH ~ PC/A, LH/ RC 
(PH: LM/A, LM/AC, V-1/C) 
(E LM/A, LM/AC, LM/C) 
'I fi.:/AC 
(I RC/AC, LH/RC) 
.10 E PC/A ~· . 
I : LtJ/,RC AG: FC/AC 
(AG: A/C)., ~ •V..:.'~) (PH: PC/AC) 
(TB : PC/C, LH/P) (PW: FC/AC, PC/C) 
Time Trend of Per Cani.ta:!.LoP.'s of E:imenc:1itures 
.05 PH: LVi/PC P1-l: A/C 
(PH : V" /A) AG: PC/A 
(PT-l: A/C, FC/AC, PC/C) 
(PT-T: re/AC, r-c/c, LH/AC, VI/C) 
(AG: PC/C, LH/C) 
(TB ; Ln/P.C 1• PP: .A/AC.10 
(PTT; A/C, E: A/C) 
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Sig. Level Significant Increase in SSE Significant Decrease in SSE 
Time Trend of Actual Real Expenditures 
.os E: LM/RC PH: A/AC 
PH: LH/RC 
TB: AC/C, Lri/RC 
(TB: A/C, RC/C, LMiA, LVi/AC, 111/C) 
(E: LM/A, LH/AC• LM/C, RC/AC, RC/C) 
(P.H: LN/~.~LM/AC, LM/C) 
(AG: A/C, LH/C) 
I: A/AC 
(I: RC/ AC, LM/AC) 
: .. 






Time Trend of Logs of Real Expenditures 
.OS PH: LH/RC PH: A/AC 
(PH: I.:cl/A) AG: RC/A 
(PH: A/C, RC/AC, RC/C) 
(PW: RC/AC, RC/C, LM/AC, LM/C) 
(AG: RC/C, LH/C) 
.10 TB: A/AC PW: A/AC 
(TB: LH/AC) (PW: A/C) 
Parentheses show comparisons between nonconsecutive administrations. 1
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In Appendix Table II, the ratios of deviations from the regression equations 
are shown in matrix form. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
It is clear that in many categories of expenditure the deviations from the 
arithmetic or natural time trends have increased phenomenally and decreased in only 
a few cases. Thus, under our hypothesis personalism has increased significantly, 
and no institutionali:?:ation or democratization has occurred. However, in most cases 
the ratios of deviations from the semi-logarithmic time trend of expenditures, which 
would be one if percentage deviations were the same in two administrations, are 
not significantly different from one at even the 10 per cent level of significance. 
In fact, most categories of expenditure show significant declines in the variation 
from the semi-logarithmic regression. 
Three interpretations of these results seem reasonable. The first is that 
only the variations in actual expenditure and particularly per capita expenditure are 
relevant. As discussed earlier, these are analogous to fees charged for mediating 
conflicts and, particularly when deflated ~y population, they should decline or at 
least not rise. In other words, our theory really provides no hypothesis about the 
ratio of percentage variations and only the results obtained with regressions on the 
natural values of expenditures are relevant" 
Alternatively one could argue that percentage and arithmetic variations are 
equally important. However, in many cases the declines in percentage variation 
simply represent presidential decisions to maintain expenditure at a relatively con­
stant, low level in the areas of little presidential interest, while devoting most 
of the time, administrative talent and the substantial amounts of nonbudgeted revenues 
. 1to areas of interest. thus, Cardenas and Lopez Mateos stressed the social side 
1Tests of the growing importance of ~onbudgeted spending as a measure of personalism 
are discussed in "Section VII. 
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of the revolution and concentrated their efforts in fields like Public Health and 
, 
Education. Also under Cardenas, l&rge agricultural expenditures were made. On the 
other hand, the three intervening presidents neglected these areas and concentrated 
on public works and economic expenditures. Thus it would be easy to predict the 
positive, significant increases in percentage variation in the trend of public 
health expenditures during the Lopez Hateos and earlier administrations, as well as 
the significant declines in variation between Cardenas and the next three administra­
tions. Similarly the large variation in agricultural expenditure in the Cardenas 
administration, relative to the significantly smaller variances in the other adminis­
trations, is predictable. Finally, the relatively large difference in variations of 
the total budget between the Lopez Mateos and Ruiz Cortines administrations seem 
1mainly due to the farmer's well-docn:.nented concern for paying off the national debt. 
Concerning ourselves only with the expenditure classes of administrations which 
stressed similar goals, a comparison of educational and public health expenditures 
between the Cardenas and Lopez i.'fateos .2.C:ministrations shows a significant increase in 
absolute deviations but no significant change, plus or minus, in the percentage 
deviations o Thus, by tb.is measure, :.:-,t::i..::;u11al.j_t.iw. did riot dcclir1e arid may have gotten 
worse. However, a comparison of the deviations in public works and in economic 
expenditure among the AviJ.a Camacho, Aleman and Ruiz Cortines administrations shows 
a significant decline in the percP-ntc:ge variations over time in some case and therfore 
some decline in personalism. In summary, t~e cesults are inconclusive, particularly 
when we take into account the idea of a party-imposed, big push in economic expendi­
ture, voiced earlier. 
Still another explanation of these inconclusive results is simply that there 
is an identification problem. While greater personalism creates an increasing 
-----··----·------------------
1see Wilkie, pp. 91-93, 164. The deviation from the trend is 30 to 50 per cent 
smaller when payments on the national debt 3.re removed from the total budget. 
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11demandn for variation in absolute terms 9 the growth of Federal revenues permits 
the increasing absolute variation to be hidden more easily. In effect, "supply" 
or ability to vary expenditure has increased simultaneously, and in percentage terms 
the net result has been a decline in variation. Thus, a more sensitive hypothesis 
is necessary. The next section is devoted to testing another, perhaps more sensitive, 
hypothesis about the political cycle, taking into account the sign pattern of 
variation. Section VII deals with still another test based on the rate of spending 
from nonbudgeted revenue. 
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VI Using the Federal Budget to Measure Institutionalization~ 
Sign Patterns in the Regression Residuals 
The previous section showed that the tests on the total deviations from the time 
trend yield results which depend crucially on the interpretation of government 
behavi~r. This is pqrticularly true when the deviations from the semi-logarithmic 
time trends were examined. It was then suggested that this may be due to a poorly 
formulated hypothesis and perhaps an identification problem. In addition there is 
a purely statistical problem which makes hypothesis testing difficult--the correct­
ness or incorrectness of the assumption regarding the independence, through time, of 
the residuals. Of course, this is an important question when determining the critical 
region for testing the hypothesis of unchanged variance. The most obvious problem 
arises directly from the Political Cycle of Public Expenditure described earlier; 
if such a cycle exists, the deviations from the trend line will not be random normal 
variates and the critical regions which were chosen to accept or reject the hypothesis 
are less meaningful. 
As discussed earlier, the Political Cycle of Expenditure implies that the sign 
pattern of residuals from the regression equation for presidential administration 
should be minus, plus, plus, minus, minus, plus. If we regard each correct sign as 
a success we can test the hypothesis that there is a Political Cycle against the 
alternative that the signs are purely random, with no pattern. In that case the 
chance of success would be one half. Appendix II lists the number of correct signs 
or successes obtained under the Political Cycle hypothesis in each administration 
for each type of expenditure and each form of the regressions (log, actual, per 
capita, actual). 
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Sunnning the number of successes across administrations for each type of expenditure, 
there are thirty trials; 1 except in public health and agriculture, the number of 
successes is significantly greater than the expected number of fifteen at the five per 
cent and, in many cases, the one per cent level. In the case of the tota]. budget the 
number of successes is significantly different from fifteen at the one per cent level. 
Tberefore·the hypothesis that the residuals or deviations are random is rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis of a Political Cycle of Expenditures is accepted. 
2 
A casual examination of the signs of the residuals seems to indicate that there 
has been some tendency for the Political Cycle of Expenditures to become more preva­
lent in the recent administrations; the number of correct signs in the three adminis­
trations of Alemc!n, Ruiz Cortines and Lopez Mateos is usually five or six, while in 
the administrations of Cardenas and Avila Camacho the number is only three or four. 
This observation supports Brandenburg's view that i;the high point of official party 
domination (of the nominating process ) was reached in 1933, ··' 3 and is confirmed by 
1The cu~ber is twenty-four for agriculture and investment owing to missing observationsin the Avila Camacho and Cardenas administrations resp~ctively. 
2The coefficient of a dummy v2riabl0., taking on the value +l in years 2, 3, and 6, -1 in
years 1, 4, 5, was estimated as a test of constant "seasonaln variation for deviations
from the trend over the Political Cycle. It generally proved to be not significantly
different from zero except when a single coefficient was estimated over the last
three administrations. The relatively high standard error, despite the favorable
result of the sign test~ would seem to indicate substantial differences from the trendfrom year to year of the Political Cycle. For example, even including the effect of
the "seasonal" dummy the sixth year residual was usually positive, and the first year
residual negative, indicating each administration really started slowly but finishedstrong. Since variations within the cycle result in a nonsignificant seasonal coeffi­
cient of the Political Cycle, it makes little sense to use differences between the
coefficients as a test of the relative strength of the cycle in different administra­tions. 
3Brandenburg, p.314 
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statistical test. Using a 2 x 2 contingency table to test the difference between the 
number of successes in the first two administrations and the last three we find that 
there is a significant, positive difference between the number of successes or correct 
residual signs in the last three administrations and the first two for total expendi­
tures, for public works and for public health. 1 
In conclusion the sign tests confirm the existence of a Political Cycle of Expen­
diture and seem to show that it has become more prevalent in the three most recent 
administrations. By this test, personalism increased rather than decreased between 
the time of Cardenas-Avila Camacho, and the three relatively colorless administrators: 
Aleman, Ruiz Cort:i.nes and Lopez Hateos. This observation might also imply that the 
Mexican presidents and administrations have used some of the decline in externally 
caused variation and some of their increased ability to resist it to impose the Politi-
cal Cycle of Expenditure upon the country. 
1The lack of a significant number of successes in the test for a Political Cycle of 
Public Expenditures in the area of Public Health (whether per capita or total expen­
diture) is thus seen to be the result of the lack of a cycle in the earlier adminis­
tration, for the later administrations show almost complete adherence to the hypothe­
sized cycle. In the case of education there is no significant difference in the 
adherence to the cycle while for agricultural and in1restment expenditures the hypo­
thesis cannot be tested because of the absence of data for the Avila Camacho and 
Cardenas administrations, respectively. 
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VII Using the Federal Budget to Measure Institutionalization: 
The P~oposed Budget and Actual Expenditure 
One last test of growing or declining institutionalization-personalism is 
available, the ratio between proposed and actual expenditures. This comparison seems 
useful given the president:Lil role in budget making and expenditure, Although 
deadlines for submission of the budgetj adjustment, and its approval appear to 
1
have institutionalized budget making, the president is actually left with large 
discretionary powers. The proposed budget is typically rubber stamped by the 
2
Congress with little or no change, not only because the Congressman halds his seat 
at the pleasure of the president, nor becsuse the Congress has too little time 
to consider the request, nor eYen br!cause membe;:-s must not upset the proposed balance 
between expenditure and revenue, but: :..argely because actual spending will typically 
3differ radically frot.1 proposed, Hany budgetary iteill.S include provision for 
amplification by the president shot~ld more f,mds become available, leaving to him 
l .f. . 4t h e amount of amp 1. 1.cat1.on. Horeover, when necessary the presidents can send 
initiatives to coyer increased exp.:::nditure;:-1 ~ the usual rea-::tion to and treatment of 
these requests is probably well described by a representative of the opposition 
party (PAN) when confronted by Lopez Hatecs' additional ,:-equests: 
alt would r2ally be gr2vE: to approve, or disapprove an amplification 
of the budtet wh:i.ch J.s equc:.l tc !~O per e:0n:: over th,::. amount originally 
authorized for the f:Lscal year •... [Sj_nce only 33 d2.7s ::-emain in the 
1 see Scott, i.Budget Nak:1.ng in He:dco," Inter-.t:..u:cr:i.c:a.n Economic Affairs, IX, No. 2, 
(Autumn, 1955) pp.3-20. 
2Wilkie p .17. 
3See Padgett, pp.147-6; Scott, pp.260-6; ~ilkie, pp.19-20. 
4Wilkie, p.274, 
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fiscal year, a vote] would be more an approval of accounts than an 
authori:z~tion to spend an additional 40 per cent of public funds."1 
The presidents have typically amplified those areas which interested them the 
most, leaving expenditures in other areas at projected levels. This procedure 
allows the government to make significant propaganda claims, while actually pursuing 
other endso Moreover, because of the difficulty of relating these actual expendi­
tures to the projected amounts, it causes significant confusion among those who 
2attempt to analyze the budget, 
Given these observations, three tests of growing or declining presidential 
control or personalism, as manifest in the difference between proposed and actual 
budgets, suggest them-selveso First, since the president has such control over 
additional spending and since the difference between proposed and actual spending 
is such a source of confusion, the existence of a significant, negative time trend 
in the ratio of proposed to actual expenditures would indicate some growth in per­
sonal presidential power or at least a relatively uncontrolled government. Second, 
since spending can be switched from one category to another after the proposed budget 
is approved, as well as augmented, we might also test for the existence of a signi-
ficant time trend in the ratio between the sum of absolute deviations from the 
proposed budtet and the proposed budget. Finally, if the party rather than the 
1 ,.
El Dia, November 28, 1964, as cited in Wilkie, pp.274-5. 
2
For example, see the discussion of the "balanced revolution" of the Lopez Mateos 
administration and the debate over Lopez Mateos' educational expenditures in Wilkie 
ppo91-3, 164. Although Lopez r1ateos, in comparison to his predecessors, budgeted
and spent large sums of money for education .and public health, aJmost all the addi­
tional funds of his administration, which amounted to 40 per cent of total spending, 
were channeled into investments and payments on the public debL See Wilkie, pp.
160-1, 166-70 One of Wilkie 1 s contributions was, of course, the tracing of these 
additional expenditureso 
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president is really becoming more important, we might expect that there should be a 
significantly positive time trend in the ratio of proposed to actual spending in the 
first year of each administration. As mentioned above, this budget is actually made 
up and approved by the new president's predecessor. If the party is gaining control 
and 'icontinuismon of the party is becoming the rule, there should be no need to 
leave the incoming president free reign; conversely, growing presidential power and 
maintenance of the tradition of noninterference with successors would dictate a lower 
and lower ratio of proposed to actual expenditure and a significantly negative coeffi­
cient. 
Regarding the ratio of proposed to ac'i.:ual spending, time trend regressions of 
the ratio of proposed to actual spending, time trend regressions of the ratio, cal­
culated using Wilkie's data, were run in actual and semi-logarithmic form. The results 
were, respectively: 
a) Y = .6883 .0O34t 
(,0883) .. (.0007) 
b) log Y = -.3817 .0050t 
(.1280) (.0010) 
where Y = proposed expenditure/actual expenditure 
t = time (t = 1, 2, .•. 30) 
and the standard errors are shown below the corresponding 
coefficients. 
As can be seen, the trend coefficients are significantly below zero at the .01 per 
cent level, supporting the hypothesis of growing presidential power and control. 
As to the ratio between abso]_ute deviations from the prcposed budget and the 
actual budget, the absolute deviations for important categories of expenditures were 
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calculated, 1 summed, and divided by the proposed budget. Regressions of the time 
trend in actual and semi-logarithmic form were run. The results were, r~spectively: 
.4073 + .OC9lt 
(.1992) ( .0013) 
log Y = .0397 + .0254t 
t (. 5697) (.0040) 
where Yt = f'l actual expenditure - proposed expenditure I;
!....~ . t t 
\ proposed expendituretL, 
t = time (t = 1, 2, 3 .•. 30) 
Thus not only did the percentage of budgeted spending, as opposed to presidentially 
motivated additions to the budget, actually decline, but, even taking into account 
switching between expenditure categories at presidential order, which appear to have 
been more counnon in the cirdenas and Aleman administrations, there has been a signifi­
cant increase since 1936 in the percentage of federal expenditure which is made at 
presidential discretion, after the proposed budget has been approved by Congress. 
Finally, a regressionwas then run on the time trend of the ratio between 
proposed and actual spending in the first year of each of the six administrations 
1The categories used were Agriculture and Irrigation, Public Health, Education, 
Communications and Public Works, Investments and Additional Economic Spending, Public 
Debt, riilitary, Industry and. Commerce, and Additional Social Spending. These 
categories amounted to almost 90 per cent of spending in the last three administra­
tions. The coverage is somewhat less in the first two administrations (roughly 80 
per cent under Cardenas, 85 per cent under Alenan), ::mt the addition of the Treasury 
expenditures to the figures brings the coverage to roughly 85 per cent in the Cardenas 
administration and 90 in the Aleman administration. The new regression results are 
almost unchanged. Interestingly, regressions on the last three admir.istrations alone, 
where coverage is very similar, yield almost the same trend coefficients and inter­
cepts. According to our hypothesis this indicai:es increasing presidential power or 
"personalismi•, as opposed to democratization in the last three administrations. 
38 
. C"" d lsince ac enas. The results in actual and semi-logarithmic form were: 
Y = .7352 - .0272t 
(.1049) ( .0072) 
logY= .3178 .0372t 
( .1431) (.0096) 
where Y = ratio of proposed to actual expenditures in the first 
year of each administration. 
t = time (t = O? 1, •oo 6) and standard errors are shown 
below th~ coefficients. 
The coefficients are significantly less than zero at the one per cent level, indicating 
a significant decrease in the ratio of proposed to actual expenditures through time and, 
according to our hypothesis, an increase in presidential-administrative control, with 
a corresponding decrease in the constraints placed on the new administration by party 
11 continuismo." 
1For the administrations from Cardenas to Lopez Hateos figures were obtained from 
Wilkie, pp.23-4. Figures for the Diaz Ordaz administration were calculated from 
Secretar{a de Industria y Comercio, Anuario Estadistico Compendiado de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, 1965 and 1966 on a comparable basis to the earlier data, i.e., 
excluding the proposed and actual expenditures of the autonomous institutes and public 
enterprises which were included in the bu<lget fa~ the first time under the Budget Reform 
Act of 1965. Interestingly enough, the ratio between proposed and actual expenditures 
in the autonomous instjtutes was higher than in federal government spending. This would 
indicate tighter government control over this spending and seems to contradict Vernon's 
view of that their spending is uncontrolled in the first year of a new government. 
See Vernon, pp.118-119. 
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VIII Summary and Conclusions 
The results of all the tests which we have devised--increasing variance in 
expenditure, increased impos:i.tion of the political cycle of expenditure, growing 
differences between proposed and actual expenditures--seem to indicate a growing ten­
dency toward arbitrary presidential and governmental control with a corresponding 
decline in institutional restraints. By our definitj_on this iG an increase in "per­
sonalism." Thus our results not only support Brandenburg 1 s contention that 11personalism 
persists," but that it is increasing. 
This is not to imply that the Mexican system of government :'~s completely unsuc­
cessful. There is no denying that adherence to the system provided some of the pressure 
for orderly transitions of power in the depths of the depression, when other Latin 
American governments were sinking into military distatorships, nor that the number of 
active political participants is not significantly greater than in the pre-revolutionary 
time of Porfirio Diaz. Noreover, even if we accept Brandenburg's contention that 
11nMexicans avoid personal dictatorship by retiring their dictators every six years 
1 
this is certainly an improvement over the 35-year personal rule of the Porfiriato, 
particularly since the increase in political mobility permits any politically ambitious 
Mexican to enter the administrative elite and work his way up, obtaining some of the 
benefits of government policy and perh~r.s even attaining the presidential jackpot. 
2 
Moreover, many others, nonparty as well as party me:nbers, benefitted from the unparal- · 
lelled growth in urban areas. Thus, although most Hexj_cans would agree that the party's 
propaganda c:airns remain unfulfilled, the system has its good points. 
~ .Brandenburg, p.3L3. 
Brandenburg in Sigmund, p,29, Brcmde11burg, pp,327-340, Of course the benefits of 
government office at low levels are not very great, but there are benefits at higher 
levels. See Wilkie, pp. 8 and 9, Vernon pp.149-1.53. 
2
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A difficult question is whether the good points such as stability, jobs for 
the party members and white-collar workers, and urban growth will continue to be 
valued so highly by the future Hexican polity, which will probably expand greatly 
and demand more general participation and benefits at the expense of the present 
governing classes and the present beneficiaries of government policy. The analysis 
of the budget has shown that the ruling groups have operated with less and less 
institutional restraint, yet the number of claimants for participation and govern­
ment benefits has also increased as a percentage of the population. Whether 
participation can continue to increase and whether the benefits can continue 
to be spread over larger and larger groups is not clear; as mentioned earlier, the 
hesitation in Mexican growth in the early 1960 1 s and the student riots of the 
late 1960 1 s may well be manifestations of the difficulty in adjusting to greater 
demands for participation and a wider distribution of government benefits. 
Another manifestation of this problem are the roadblocks to upward mobility in 
the upper echelons of the trade unions and the army. 1 
If the twin problem of greater participation and better distribution of 
benefits can be solved through a combination of interest group manipulation by 
a 11Liberal Nachiavelliann president who is really not a vote aggregator, but 
a social reformer, and by the urban middle group giving up some of their power 
and benefits to forestall more serious threats to their position, then budgetary 
policy may become more stable. As discussed in the introduction, assuming 
always that stable or steadily growing expenditures are more productive, it seems 
reasonable for the growing numbe'.'.." of participants to develop an institutional 
Brandenburg, p. 336. 
1 
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system which coLstrains the government to reduce deviations from the trend in 
expenditures which benefits only the governors. Moreover, a larger number of 
more equal participants will decrease the need to use the confusing tactic 
of large supplementary appropriations. In fact, the representatives of the 
participants might even develop an interest in more accurate published appropri­
ations in order to pinpoint deviations from nfair
11 shares and thereby mobilize 
support within their interest groups. Perhaps the 1965 Budgetary Reform, which 
consolidated the accounts of the government and the increasingly important 
autonomous institutes, is a step in this direction. 
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tof Cor Correct SSE of More Recent Admi 
Adm Const SE Time SE Stat SSE Coef Sign SSE of Earlier Admin. 
C 84.07 8.27 2.07 .628 3.30 110.4 .86 4 
AC 106.42 6.58 1.09 ,795 1.36 177,2 .56 3 . 1.605 
A 146.92 21.68 4.80 2.080 2.31 1210.2 ,70 6 10.961 6.83 
RC 195.03 21.50 5.66 1.376 4.12 529.9 .90 4 4,799 2,991 .438 
L.M 287.69 38.16 7,27 4.240 1.71 5032,5 .65 6 45,58 28.407 4.158 9.498 
C 4.427 1.03 .0255 .0081 3.14 .0185 .84 4 
AC 4.666 .63 .0106 .0075 1.41 .0156 .58 3 .843 
A 4,979 1.46 .0327 .0138 2.37 .0534 .76 6 2.886 3.423 
RC 5.267 1.16 .0301 .0080 3-77 .0178 .88 5 -957 1.135 .331 
LM 5.653 1.31 .0250 .0146 1.72 .0595 .65 6 3.216 3.814 1.114 3.361 
C 1593 195 52.. 3 11.5 4.5 37127 .92 4 
AC 2286 203 49,7 16.3 3.0 75227 .83 3 2.026 
A 3724 714 175.0 57,1 3.1 912575 .84 6 24.579 12.131 
RC 5981 933 261.8 38.9 6.7 422638 .96 5 11.384 5,618 .463 
IM 10617 1859 439,9 160.1 2.7 7177213 .81 6 193.314 95.408 7.865 16.981 
C 14.27 .129 .0340 .0082 4.1~- .0188 ,90 4 
AC 14.64 .092 .0026 .0074 3,07 .0152 .84 3 .803 
A 15.11 .188 .0469 .0145 3.23 .0588 .85 6 3.128 3.894 
RC 15.59 .164 .0452 .0080 5.67 .0178 .94 5 .947 1.179 .303 
IM 16.16 .172 .0411 .0145 2.83 .0592 .82 6 3.149 3.921 1.007 3,326 
Source of Data 
1935-1963 J. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social 
Change Since 1910. 
1964 Secretaria de Industria y Comercio,Anuario Estadistico 
Per Capita figures 1950 pesos (old deflater) Actual total budgets 1950 pesos 
Other total figures for 1935-1962 calculated using population figures found 
in Wilkie, Ibid., p. 24. Population for 1963 and 1964 calculated from 1962 
population using a 3.3 percent growth rate, which was figure used in period. 
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APPENDIX TABLES I .AND II 
Budget 
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29.617 27,731 5,758 
Total Educ. 























































APPENDIX TABLES I Al\TD II 
No. 
Budget 
Category Adm Const SE Coef SE t SSE cc 
Correct 
Signs 
SSE of Recent Adm.in. 





















Health A 5.16 .436 -.123 .017 -7.16 .082 .96 5 .064 .051 
RC 5.91 .897 .251 .039 6.39 .431 .95 3 .338 .265 .524 

































Health RC 1.765 .148 .042 .006 7.26 .009 .96 3 .099 .121 3.00 
LM 2.302 .149 .015 .021 .71 .119 .34 5 1.263 1.546 38.29 12.76 
Total Public C 78 28 8.0 1.3 6.2 46326 .95 1 
Health AC 119 18 -3.9 1.7 -2.2 82043 .75 3 1.770 
A 129 6 -1.2 .7 -1.9 12191 .69 5 .263 .148 
RC 182 37 10.5 1.4 7.6 51927 .97 3 1.120 .633 4.259 
LM 371 60 10.5 1.0 1.5 13799631 .60 5 297.65 168.20 11319.4 265.75 
Log Total C 18.1 .39 .107 .018 6.o .0932 .95 l 
Public AC 18.6 .16 -.037 .016 -2.2 .0765 .74 3 .817 
Health A 18.7 .05 -.010 .005 1.8 .0079 .68 5 .085 .104 
RC 19.0 .19 .059 .006 9.7 .0095 .98 3 .102 .125 1.202 
LM 19.7 .17 .030 .020 1.5 .1146 .71 5 1.230 1.504 14.506 12.063 
Log Per C 11.27 2.40 -.106 .347 -.3 33. 763 .16 4 
Capita 



















RC 21.90 1.63 .313 .180 1.7 9.132 .66 5 .270 .377 1.275 
LM 24.86 2.13 .122 .305 .4 26.103 .20 5 .773 1.078 .446 2.858 























RC 3.083 .075 .014 .0085 1.616 .0202 .628 3 .078 .076 .371 
LM 3.210 .004 .004 .0124 .322 .0431 .159 5 .167 .162 •793 2.139 
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APPENDIX TABLES I AJ\JD II 
Coef No. 
Budget of t Cor Correct SSE of Recent Admin. 
Category Adm Const SE Time SE Stat SSE Coef Sign SSE of Earlier Adm.in. 
Total C 21.2 61.4 -.467 6.48 .07 .04 1176647 4 
Public AC 23,0 6.9 1.15 .82 1.4 ,57 1906988 2 1.621 
Works A 48.2 7.8 1.70 ,77 2.2 .74 1644493 6 1.398 .862 
RC 67.0 7.8 1.98 .56 3,5 .87 877791 5 ,746 .460 ,534 
LM 91.4 10.2 1.94 1.14 1.7 ,65 3694158 5 3,139 1.937 2.264 4.208 
Log Total C 19.2 .21 .002 ,030 ,07 .03 .2623 4 
Public AC 19.2 .28 .055 .031 1.8 .67 .2638 2 1.006 
Works A 20.0 .15 .034 .014 2.2 ,75 .0624 6 .238 .237 
RC 20.3 .12 .029 .008 3.5 .87 .0201 5 .077 .076 .322 
IM 20.6 .11 .020 .012 1.7 .64 .0417 5 .159 .158 1.668 2.074 
Per Capita C 6.1 1.42 .261 .163 1.6 .63 7.44 3 
Agri. AC missing data for one year 
A 13.8 2.48 .229 .244 .7 .32 33.14 4 4.454 
RC 16.4 1.68 --358 .169 -2.1 .73 8.02 5 1.078 .242 
IM 18.1 4.31 1.16 .27 4.3 .91 19.98 3 2.685 .603 2.491 
Log Per C 1.78 .29 .054 .032 1.7 .64 .2983 3 
Capita AC 
Agri. A 2.61 .17 .012 .023 .52 .2? .1542 4 .517 
RC 2.79 .10 .021 .009 -2.2 .75 .0253 5 .085 .164 
LM 2.87 .23 .061 .013 4.5 .91 .0514 3 .172 .333 2.032 
Total Agri. C 116 29 5,78 3.01 1.9 .69 255071 3 
AC 
A 349 76 11.56 9.6 1.2 .51 2565881 4 10.059 
RC 498 36 -3.37 5.0 -.7 .32 688690 5 2.680 .268 
LM 673 200 54.3 10.8 5.0 ,93 3294845 3 12.917 1.284 4.784 
Log Total C 18.5 .31 .063 .033 1.9 .69 .301 3 
Agri. AC 
A 19,7 .19 .027 .024 1.1 .48 .1674 4 .556 
RC 20.0 .07 ·-.006 .009 -.7 .32 .0253 5 .084 .151 





APPENDIX TABLES I .AJ\TD II I 
Coef No. 
t Cor Correct SSE of Recent AdminBudget of 
SSE of earlier AdmiCategory Adm Const SE Time SE Stat SSE Coef Sign 
Invest. & C missing data for one year 
Econ Exp AC 14.75 3.6 .87 .28 3.1 22.442 .84 2 
Per Capita A 41.16 15.0 3.36 1.40 2.4 555.403 0 77 5 35.99 
RC 60.83 10.0 1.87 1.13 1.7 360.838 .64 4 31.83 .88 
LM 59.43 13.2 -.35 1.92 -.2 1035,21 .09 5 143.62 4.00 4.51 
Invest. per C missing data for one year 
2Capita Logs AC 2.65 .27 .064 .025 2.5 .177 •79 
A 3.64 .40 .0911 .035 2.7 •3112 .80 4 1.93 
RC 4.09 .18 .034 .020 1.7 .110 .65 4 .62 .32 
LM 4.06 .22 -.005 .032 -.15 .293 .08 4 1.65 .86 2.66 
Total C missing data for one year 
Invest. AC 319 87 22.5 5.9 3.8 .96524 .89 2 
A 1051 415 99,3 35.2 2.8 34.736 .82 5 2.47 
RC 1866 367 84.6 33.1 2.6 30,780 .79 4 16.08 .65 
LM 2181 489 26.1 70.3 .4 138.63 .18 4 46.13 1.86 2.87 
Log 
·; 
•Total C missing data for one year 
Invest. AC 12.63 .3 .076 .025 3.0 .177 .83 2 
A 13.78 .4 .109 .035 3.1 .342 .84 4 1.93 
RC 14.42 .2 .049 .020 2.5 .110 .78 4 .62 .32 
.011 .03 .3 .293 .17 4 1.65 .86 2.66LM 14.57 .2 
Figures for period 1939-1964 were deflated. by the Banco de Mexico's whole­
sale index covering 210 items rather then Wilkie's price index. 
Wilkie was interested in analyzing expenditure over longer periods and so 
could not use the wholesale price index which begins in 1939. For the years 
1935 through 1938 it was essentially assumed that the wholesale index was 2 percent 
higher than Wilkie's index. This linking factor is the result of using the average 
ratio 1.Jetween Wilkie's index and the Banco de Mexico's index in the period 
1939 to 1941.
For Public Works a slightly different index was used. 
The index used in this study is based upon figures taken from the afore­
mentioned Banco de Mexico index and is weighted as follows: consumption 
articles (representing wages)= .60; metals= .15; construction material= .15; 
vehicles and accessories= .10. 
